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Abstract
We address the issue of modeling and quantifying the asset substitution problem
in a setting where equityholders decisions alter both the volatility and the return of
the firm cash flows. Our results contrast with those obtained in models where the
agency problem is reduced to a pure risk-shifting problem. We find larger agency
costs and lower optimal leverages. We show that covenants that prevent equityholders
from adopting an activity with high volatility and low return are value enhancing only
when the agency problem is severe enough. Our model highlights the tradeoff between
ex-post inefficient behavior of equityholders and inefficient covenant restrictions.
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1. Introduction
The asset substitution problem, first documented by Jensen and Meckling (1978), results
from the incentives of equityholders to extract value from debtholders by avoiding safe pos-
itive net present value projects. This implies a decrease in the value of the firm, as a result
of a decrease in the value of the debt and a smaller increase in the value of the equity. This
opportunistic behavior of equityholders is incorporated into the price of debt and the ex
ante solution to this agency problem is therefore to issue less debt. As a result, the optimal
capital structure of the firm highlights the benefit of issuing debt because of tax benefits, and
the cost of issuing debt because of both asset substitution problem and bankruptcy costs.
It has long been recognized that such a standard stockholder-bondholder conflict might be
a key for understanding observed behavior of firms. It is for instance well documented, see
Graham (2000), that firms tend to choose large amount of equity in their capital structure
and set debt levels well below what would maximize the tax benefits of debt.
Continuous time contingent-claims analysis offers a natural setting for modeling and
quantifying the asset substitution effect. The prototype of this approach is the model of
Leland (1998), in which equityholders can choose a high or a low volatility level for the
firm’s assets once the debt is in place. Leland (1998) studies the impact of equityholders’
ex post flexibility to choose volatility on the firm’s optimal capital structure and finds that
agency costs restrict leverage and debt maturity and increase yield spreads. Other results
are however more surprising (and somewhat disappointing): agency costs of debt due to the
asset substitution effect are about 1.5% which is far less than the tax benefits of debt, bond
covenants that restrict equityholders from adopting the high volatility parameter are useless,
furthermore the optimal leverage when there is an agency problem is larger than the optimal
leverage of a firm that cannot increase risk.
The discussion on asset substitution in a contingent-claims analysis setting has been
recently extended in several directions. For instance, Henessy and Tserlukevich (2004) study
the role of Warrant in solving agency costs in a setting with dynamic volatility choice.
They find that warrants mitigate asset substitution but exacerbate the agency problem
of premature default. Childs, Mauer and Ott (2005) provide a numerical model which
accommodates both asset substitution and flexibility to increase or decrease the debt level
at maturity dates. They find that financing flexibility encourages the use of short term debt
and significantly reduces agency costs of investment distortions. Ju and Ou-Yang (2005)
show that, in a dynamic model in which the firm issues debt multiple times, the incentives
of equityholders to increase volatility of firm’s assets are reduced. Other related works on
asset substitution are Mello and Parsons (1992), Mauer and Triantis (1994), Parrino and
Weisbach (1999), Ericsson (2000), De´camps and Faure-Grimaud (2002), Mauer and Sarkar
(2005).
In this paper, we leave aside these meaningful extensions and depart from the existing
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literature by adopting the view that the asset substitution problem can be also explained
by bad investments rather than by simply pure excessive risk taking. According to Bliss
(2001) this agency problem may be fundamental: “Poor (apparently irrational) investments
are as problematic as excessively risky projects (with positive risk-adjusted returns)”. In
particular Bliss (2001) reviews several empirical articles that conclude that bank failures are
often provoked by bad investments rather than bad luck (and excessive risk taking). This
leads us to consider a model in which equityholders can alter both the risk adjusted expected
growth rate and the volatility of the cash flows generated by the firm’s assets. Specifically,
in our model, the firm’s activity generates a lognormal cash flows process characterized by a
given risk-adjusted expected growth rate and a given volatility. At any time equityholders
have the opportunity to switch from a safe business activity in place to a poor business
activity. The adoption of the poor activity lowers the risk adjusted expected growth rate of
the cash flows process and increases its volatility. Therefore two problems jointly define asset
substitution (i) a pure risk-shifting problem acting on the volatility of the growth rate of the
cash flows, and (ii) a first order stochastic dominance problem acting on the risk adjusted
expected growth rate of the cash flows. We identify situations where equityholders decide
to adopt the poor activity. Such a decision is not socially optimal and generates a loss in
the firm value that we analyze. We then investigate how covenant rules written in the debt
indenture can reduce the amount of these agency costs.
More precisely, in our model, debt is a coupon bond with infinite maturity and coupon
payment offers tax deduction. As in Leland (1998) and many others, we consider endogenous
bankruptcy. That is, equityholders have the option to decide when to cease paying the
coupon and to declare bankruptcy. The bankruptcy policy is therefore chosen to maximize
the value of equity, given the limited liability of equity and the debt structure. Initially,
the firm is run with the safe activity. At each instant of time equityholders can switch in
an irreversible way to the poor business activity. Switching generates agency costs whose
magnitude is defined as the difference between the optimal firm value when the switching
policy can be contracted ex ante (before debt is in place) and the optimal firm value when
the switching decision policy is taken ex post (that is after debt is in place). In each case
the optimal capital structure is characterized by the coupon rate that maximizes the initial
firm value. The tradeoff underlying the model is as follows. On the one hand equityholders
have incentives to switch to the poor activity because it increases their option value to
declare bankruptcy. On the other hand switching entails an opportunity cost since it lowers
the (risk adjusted) instantaneous return of the cash flows. We show that a drop of the
cash flows can throw equityholders in a gamble for resurrection situation which leads them
to choose the poor business activity despite its lower risk adjusted expected return. An
alternative interpretation of our model is to see the poor business activity as the result of
the decision of the equityholders to cease to monitor the firm’s assets, from which it results
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lower risk adjusted return and larger uncertainty.
Our results contrast with the previous literature where the asset substitution problem
is reduced to a pure risk-shifting problem. For example, depending on the severity of the
agency problem, agency costs of debt at the optimal leverage can be large (more than 7 %).
Accordingly, optimal leverage when an agency problem exists is lower than that of a firm
that cannot change its activity. We pursue the analysis recognizing that covenants written
in the debt indenture forcing equityholders to go bankrupt modify switching incentives and
highly affect the level of agency costs. We show that, the so-called “cash flows based”
covenant rule, that triggers bankruptcy as soon as the instantaneous cash flows generated
by the firm activity is not sufficient to cover the instantaneous payment to debtholders,
eliminates switching incentives but increases agency costs because of premature liquidation.
We then introduce a new covenant rule defined as the smallest liquidation trigger such that
the switching problem disappears. We show that if the agency problem is severe enough,
such a covenant rule can dramatically reduce agency costs (but not eliminate them). On
the contrary if the agency problem is not severe enough such a covenant rule increases
agency costs and it is better to let equityholders switch to the poor activity and default
strategically. Our model highlights the tradeoff between ex-post inefficient equityholders
behavior and inefficient covenant restrictions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section
3 analyzes optimal policies followed by equityholders, Section 4 defines and characterizes
optimal capital structure and agency costs, Section 5 studies the role of covenants. Section
7 concludes. Proofs are in Appendix.
2. The model
Throughout the paper we denote by W = (Wt)t≥0 a Brownian motion defined on a com-
plete probability space (Ω,F ,Q) and by (Ft)t≥0 the augmentation with respect to Q of the
filtration generated by W. We denote by T the set of Ft adapted stopping times.
2.1. A simple model of the firm.
We start by reviewing a standard model of a firm. The ideas and the results presented in
this subsection are those of Leland (1994), Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) or more recently
Leland and Skarabot (2004). The underlying state variable X is the cash flows generated by
the firm’s activity (that is the firm’s earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)). We denote
by “A” the activity in place and assume that the generated cash flows follow the stochastic
differential equation
dXt,A
Xt,A
= µAdt+ σAdWt, (1)
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with initial condition X0,A = x, where µA is the instantaneous risk-adjusted expected growth
rate of the cash flows and σA the volatility of the growth rate. There is a risk free asset
that yields a constant instantaneous rate of return r > µA
1. Markets are complete and
the probability Q denotes the unique risk neutral probability measure. The value of the
unlevered firm for a current value x of the cash flows, after paying corporate income taxes,
is
vA(x) = (1− θ)E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtXxt,A dt
]
=
x
r − µA (1− θ),
where θ is a tax rate on corporate income. The total payout rate to all security holders is
therefore
δA =
(1− θ)x
vA(x)
= r − µA (2)
and consequently, the unlevered asset value V under the risk neutral measure Q follows the
process
dVt,A
Vt,A
= (r − δA)dt+ σAdWt. (3)
Note that, because of relation (2), equations (3) and (1) are the same and we could consider
as well for state variable the dynamics of the unlevered asset value of the firm. Note also
that, inclusive of the payout rate δA, the total (risk-adjusted) expected rate of return of the
unlevered asset value of the firm is δA + (r − δA) = r, as it must be under the risk neutral
measure Q.
The firm chooses its initial capital structure consisting of perpetual coupon bond c that
remains constant until equityholders endogenously default. In such a simple setting, the firm
issues debt so as to take advantage of the tax shields offered for interest expenses. Failure
to pay the coupon c triggers immediate liquidation of the firm. At liquidation, a fraction γ
of the unlevered firm value is lost as a frictional cost. The liquidation value of the firm is
therefore
(1− θ)(1− γ)x
r − µA . (4)
Taking into account tax benefits and bankruptcy cost, the value of the levered firm is
vA(x) = E
[∫ τAL
0
e−rt((1− θ)Xxt,A + θc) dt + e−rτ
A
L
(1− θ)(1− γ)
r − µA X
x
τAL ,A
]
.
where the stopping time τAL defines the bankruptcy policy chosen by equityholders so as to
maximize the value of their claim. Formally, the problem of the equityholders is: Find the
stopping time τAL ∈ T satisfying
EA(x) ≡ sup
τ∈T
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(1− θ) (Xxt,A − c) dt] = E
[∫ τAL
0
e−rt(1− θ) (Xxt,A − c) dt.
]
(5)
1We assume that the expected present value of the cash flows is positive and finite and therefore that
r > µA.
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Standard computations show that the optimal bankruptcy policy is a trigger policy de-
fined by the stopping time τAL = inf{t ≥ 0 s.t Xt,A = xAL} with xAL = −
αA
1− αA
c
r
1
νA
where
νA denotes the ratio
1
r − µA and αA denotes the negative root of the quadratic equation
y(y − 1)σ2A
2
+ yµA = r. This implies the following expressions for the equity value EA(x),
the firm value vA(x) and the debt value DA(x): EA(x) = (1− θ)
{
xνA − c
r
+
(c
r
− xALνA
)( x
xAL
)αA}
if x > xAL ,
EA(x) = 0 if x ≤ xAL
(6)
and 
vA(x) = (1− θ)xνA + θc
r
−
(
θc
r
+ xALγ(1− θ)νA
)(
x
xAL
)αA
if x > xAL ,
vA(x) = (1− γ)(1− θ)xνA if x ≤ xAL
The debt value satisfies the relation
DA(x) = vA(x)− EA(x) = E
[∫ τAL
0
e−rtcdt + e−rτ
A
L
(1− θ)(1− γ)
r − µA X
x
τAL ,A
]
or equivalently,
DA(x) =
c
r
− ( c
r
− xAL(1− γ)(1− θ)νA
) (
x
xAL
)αA
if x > xAL ,
DA(x) = (1− γ)(1− θ)xνA if x ≤ xAL
The interpretation of (6) is standard. The equity value is equal to (νAx − cr )(1 − θ),
the after tax net present value of equity if equityholders never declare bankruptcy, plus the
option value associated to the irreversible closure decision at the trigger xAL . We denote in
the sequel by xAPV =
1
νA
c
r
, the trigger that equalizes to zero the present value of equities
under perpetual continuation. Note that, in line with the real option theory, the bankruptcy
trigger xAL chosen by the equityholders is smaller than the net present value trigger x
A
PV .
As usual in such a classical setting, the optimal capital structure is then characterized
by the coupon c to be issued that maximizes the initial firm value.
2.2. A simple model of the firm with risk flexibility.
We now extend this standard model of capital structure by considering that, at any time,
equityholders have the option to switch to a poor business activity (referred as “B” activity)
that lowers the drift and increases the volatility of the cash flows. There is no monetary
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cost to change the activity but the decision to switch is irreversible. Specifically the poor
activity “B” generates cash flows (“EBIT”) satisfying the stochastic differential equation
dXt,B
Xt,B
= µBdt+ σBdWt, (7)
with µB < µA and σB > σA. Equivalently, the unlevered asset value V under the risk neutral
measure Q follows the process
dVt,B
Vt,B
= (r − δB)dt+ σBdWt, (8)
where
δB =
(1− θ)x
vB(x)
= r − µB, (9)
and the value of the unlevered firm is
vB(x) = (1− θ)E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtXxt,B dt
]
=
x
r − µB (1− θ) <
x
r − µA (1− θ).
The key inequalities µA > µB and σB > σA characterize the tradeoff that drives our model.
Because of limited liability equityholders will be tempted to choose the riskier activity (that
is the largest possible volatility). However this choice has an opportunity cost since it induces
a lower expected return (µB < µA). Intuitively, because of this opportunity cost, as long
as the cash flows are large enough, changing the activity of the firm (that is switching to
the poor activity) is not attractive and equityholders run the firm under the safe activity.
However if the cash flows sharply drop, the lower expected return of the high risk activity
may not dissuade equityholders from increasing the riskiness of the cash flows. Saying it
differently, the lower ∆µ ≡ µA − µB with respect to ∆σ ≡ σB − σA, the larger are the
switching incentives of equityholders. Accordingly, after switching, the liquidation value of
the firm becomes
(1− θ)(1− γ)x
r − µB . (10)
To sum up, in our model, equityholders have to decide (i) when to cease the activity in
place and switch to the poor activity, (ii) when to liquidate. We refer to these two irreversible
decisions as the switching/liquidation policy.
3. Optimal switching/liquidation policy.
In order to study the optimal switching/liquidation policy, we first characterize situations
where, whatever the initial value of the cash flows and the coupon c, (i) equityholders opti-
mally decide to run the firm always under the safe activity, and (ii) equityholders immediately
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adopt the poor activity. We then study the more interesting case where always choosing the
safe or the poor activity is not optimal.
In the previous section we derived EA(.), the equity value assuming equityholders run
the firm under the safe activity (and optimally liquidate at time τAL ). In the same vein we
can obtain EB(.), the equity value when equityholders run the firm always under the poor
activity. We summarize this as follows.
Lemma 3.1 Assume equityholders choose the poor activity, (that is the dynamics of the cash
flows obeys to the diffusion process (7)) then, the optimal liquidation policy is defined by the
random time τBL where τ
B
L = inf{t ≥ 0 s.t xt = xBL} with xBL = −
αB
1− αB
c
r
1
νB
. In this case,
the value of equity is defined by the equality
EB(x) = E
[∫ τBL
0
e−rt(1− θ)(Xxt,B − c)dt
]
or equivalently, EB(x) = (1− θ)
{
xνB − c
r
+
(c
r
− xBLνB
)( x
xBL
)αB}
if x > xBL ,
EB(x) = 0 if x ≤ xBL
where νB denotes the ratio
1
r−µB and αB denotes the negative root of the quadratic equation
y(y − 1)σ2B
2
+ yµB = r.
The two following lemma identify the cases where equity value E(x) is either EB(x)
(lemma 3.2), or EA(x) (lemma 3.3).
Lemma 3.2 If µA = µB and σA < σB then, equityholders immediately choose the poor
activity and liquidate the firm at the trigger xBL .
Here, the switching decision is reduced to a pure risk shifting problem. Equity value is
increasing and convex with respect to the cash flows x. In turn, this implies that equity value
increases with the volatility of the cash flows. Formally, we have that for all x ∈ (0,∞),
EA(x) < EB(x) (see figure 1). Consequently, equityholders immediately choose the poor
activity, (that is the high risk activity), and liquidate at the trigger xBL . Note that the
liquidation trigger is decreasing with the volatility and we have xBL < x
A
L . Since equityholders
get nothing in the bankruptcy event, a necessary condition for never switching to the high-
risk activity being always optimal is clearly xBL > x
A
L . The following lemma shows that it is
also a sufficient condition.
Lemma 3.3 If xAL < x
B
L then, equityholders optimally never choose the poor activity and
liquidate at the trigger xAL .
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The condition xAL < x
B
L ensures that EA(x) > EB(x) for all values of x (see figure 2). Equi-
tyholders cannot enjoy the high risk activity because the gain from increasing the volatility
does not compensate the loss in the expected return.
In these two polar cases the tradeoff between increasing riskiness and decreasing expected
return that drives our model is extreme. On the one hand, when increasing risk is costless
(that is µA = µB) equityholders are better off choosing immediately the riskier activity and
then never switch to the low risk activity. On the other hand, when ∆µ is large with respect
to ∆σ, the high risk activity throws down bankruptcy and equityholders optimally always
choose the low risk activity.
We now study the more interesting case where neither choosing forever the poor activity
or the safe activity is optimal. According to the two previous lemma, a necessary and
sufficient condition for that is xBL < x
A
L and µA > µB. Intuitively, switching to the poor
activity is optimal for low values of the cash flows (since for xBL < x < x
A
L we have EB(x) > 0
and EA(x) = 0), whereas for sufficiently large values of the cash flows it may be optimal to
postpone the switching decision in order to benefit from the larger expected return of the
safe activity.
Assuming equityholders start running the firm under the safe activity, their problem is
to decide when to switch to the poor activity. Formally, equityholders solve the optimal
stopping time problem: Find the stopping times τ ?S < τ
?
L ∈ T satisfying
E(x) ≡ (1− θ) sup
τS∈T ,τL∈T
{
E
[∫ τS
0
e−rt(Xxt,A − c)dt+ E
[∫ τL
τS
e−rt(X
τS ,X
x
τS,A
t,B − c)dt|FτS
]]}
= (1− θ)
{
E
[∫ τ?S
0
e−rt(Xxt,A − c)dt+ E
[∫ τ?L
τ?S
e−rt(X
τ?S ,X
x
τ?
S
,A
t,B − c)dt|Fτ?S
]]}
(11)
where X
τS ,X
x
τS,A
t,B denotes the process Xt,B that takes value X
x
τS ,A
at time τS. We show the
following:
Proposition 3.1 If xBL < x
A
L and µA > µB then, equityholders strategically switch to the
poor activity at the random time τ ?S = inf{t ≥ 0 s.t Xt = xS} and declare bankruptcy at
the random time τBL = inf{t ≥ 0 s.t Xt = xBL}. The triggers xS and xBL are defined by the
relations
xS =
(
(αB − αA)νB
(νA − νB)(1− αA)(−αB)
) 1
1−αB
xBL , and x
B
L = −
αB
1− αB
c
r
1
νB
.
The value of equity is defined by the equalities
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
E(x) = (1− θ)
{
xνA − c
r
− xS(νA − νB)
(
x
xS
)αA
+
(
c
r
− xBLνB
) (
x
xS
)αA (
xS
xBL
)αB }
if x > xS,
E(x) = (1− θ)
{
xνB − c
r
+
(c
r
− xBLνB
)( x
xBL
)αB}
if xBL < x ≤ xS,
E(x) = 0 if x < xBL .
Our proposition deserves some comments. First, it shows that the conditions xBL < x
A
L
and µA > µB are necessary and sufficient for switching from the safe activity to the poor
activity being optimal. Second, it shows that the optimal switching policy is characterized by
a switching trigger xS > x
A
L that we derive explicitly
2. Figure 3 illustrates our proposition.
Once the cash flows go below the switching trigger xS equityholders optimally switch to the
poor activity. Because this choice is by assumption irreversible, the equity value is then
equal to EB, the equity value under the poor activity. As long as the cash flows are larger
than xS, the value of the option to switch is strictly positive and E(x) > EG(x).
In our setting, an approximate measure for the severity of the agency problem is the
length of the interval [xBL , x
A
L ]. Indeed the larger ∆σ, the larger the length of the interval
[xBL , x
A
L ] and the larger the switching trigger xS. On the contrary the larger ∆µ, the lower
the distance between xBL and x
A
L . Ultimately, when ∆µ is too large with respect ∆σ, the
trigger xBL becomes larger than the trigger x
A
L , any incentive to choose the poor activity
disappears and, according to lemma 3.3, equityholders always choose the safe activity. It is
interesting to compare the switching trigger xS to the triggers x
A
PV =
c
r
1
νA
and xBPV =
c
r
1
νB
that equalizes to 0 the net present value of equity under perpetual continuation when the
firm is run, respectively with the safe activity and with the poor activity. In particular, when
xAPV < xS < x
B
PV the present value of equity evaluated at the switching point xS is positive
under the safe activity but negative under the poor activity. Equityholders nevertheless
strategically switch to the poor activity at the trigger xS because the increase in their option
value to declare bankruptcy compensates the loss in the net present value defined by the
difference νA − νB.
We now give the ex post firm value v(x), that is the value of the firm when equityholders
strategically switch at the trigger xS. We have
v(x) = E
[∫ τS
0
e−rt((1− θ)Xxt,A + θc) dt + e−rτSvB(XxτS ,A)
]
,
where
vB(x) = E
[∫ τBL
0
e−rt((1− θ)Xxt,B + θc) dt + e−rτ
B
L (1− γ)(1− θ)νBXxτBL ,B
]
.
2This last property relies on the irreversibility assumption we made on the decision to switch to the poor
business activity. If the switching decision is reversible then, the optimal switching decision is much more
difficult to establish and not always defined by a simple threshold strategy as in proposition 3.1
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Direct computations yield to

v(x) = (1− θ)xνA + θc
r
− (1− θ)xS (νA − νB)
(
x
xS
)αA
− ( θc
r
+ xBLγ(1− θ)νB
) (
x
xS
)αA (
xS
xBL
)αB
if x > xS,
v(x) = (1− θ)xνB + θc
r
−
(
θc
r
+ xBLγ(1− θ)νB
)(
x
xBL
)αB
if xBL < x ≤ xS,
v(x) = (1− γ)(1− θ)xνB if x ≤ xBL
(12)
Let us comment briefly equations (12). For x ≤ xBL the firm is all-equity financed, is run by
the former debtholders and we have v(x) = (1− γ)(1− θ)E [∫∞
0
e−rtXxt,Bdt
]
= (1− γ)(1−
θ)xνB. For x
B
L < x < xS, the firm value is equal to the after tax present value of the cash flows
when it is run under the poor activity ((1−θ)xνB) plus the present value of tax benefits ( θcr )
minus the discounted expected loss in case of bankruptcy (
(
θc
r
+ xBLγ(1− θ)νB
) (
x
xBL
)αB
).
The amount of this loss is equal, at the bankruptcy trigger, to the loss of the tax benefits
( θc
r
) plus the loss due to the bankruptcy cost (xBLγ(1 − θ)νB). For x > xS, the additional
term xS(1−θ) (νA − νB)
(
x
xS
)αA
represents the discounted expected loss in net present value
that occurs at the switching trigger xS.
4. Optimal Capital Structure and Agency costs
Equityholders’ option to change the activity at the trigger xS entails loss in value for
debtholders and for the whole firm. If equityholders were able to commit to a certain man-
agement policy before debt is issued, this problem will disappear. Staying in the tradition of
Leland (1998) we define agency costs as the difference between the optimal firm value when
the switching policy can be contracted ex ante (before debt is in place) and the optimal firm
value when the switching decision policy is taken ex post (that is after debt is in place). In
each case the optimal capital structure is characterized by the coupon rate that maximizes
the initial firm value. We now turn to the numerical implementation of our model and we
analyze in this section, through several examples, properties of the optimal capital structure
and the magnitude of the agency costs. Table 1 lists the baseline parameters that support
our analysis. Tables 2-3-4-5 report for different values of the couples (µA, σA) and (µB, σB)
the optimal capital structure for the ex ante case and for the ex post case. The following
observations can be made.
1. When the firm’s activity policy can be committed ex ante to maximize firm value,
equityholders will never switch to the high risk activity. The optimal ex ante firm value
coincides in our setting with the optimal firm value when there is no risk flexibility.
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The agency costs, that can be very large, are highly sensitive to a change in ∆µ,
the opportunity cost of choosing the high risk activity. Tables 3 and 4 illustrate
this point with agency costs dropping from 13.24% to 1.92% for a 2.5% increase of
∆µ. Accordingly, agency costs increase with ∆σ (that is agency costs increase when
equityholders have more incentive to choose the high risk activity). In tables 2 and 3
agency costs increase from 1.02% to 13.24% when ∆σ goes from 5% to 30%.
2. The model predicts that the larger the severity of the agency problem, the lower
the optimal leverage ratios. Precisely, optimal leverages in presence of agency costs
decrease relative to the ex ante case where there is no risk flexibility. In table 3,
leverages drop by more than 35% with respect to the ex ante case where there is no
risk flexibility.
3. In our model, agency costs have no significant effect on yield spreads. The reason is
that we focus on a pure switching problem between two activities. In particular, we do
not consider an additional financing need at the switching trigger nor production costs
for generating the cash flows. Remark however that yield spreads are lower in the ex
post case than in the ex ante case. This result can be explained noting that optimal
leverage in the ex ante case is larger than optimal leverage in the ex post case.
5. Covenants
Following Leland (1998) and many others, we have considered the case of endogenous
bankruptcy (equityholders decide the time to go bankrupt). It is however also well doc-
umented that covenants written in the debt indenture can trigger bankruptcy. For instance,
the so-called “cash flows based” covenant rule triggers bankruptcy as soon as the instan-
taneous cash flows Xt are not sufficient to cover payments c to debtholders. This is the
line followed by Kim et al (1993), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Fan and Sundaresan
(2000) or Ericsson (2000). The purpose of this section is to study how such covenant rules
impact on the magnitude of agency costs, a task that seems to have been neglected by the
literature3. Under the “cash flows based” covenant rule, the equity value EA(x) becomes{
EA(x) = (1− θ)
{
xνA − c
r
+
(c
r
− cνA
)(x
c
)αA}
if x > c,
EA(x) = 0 if x ≤ c
(13)
It is worth noting that, in Ericsson (2000), equityholders can shift to a high volatility level
but cannot alter the instantaneous expected growth rate which is furthermore assumed to
be negative (that is, with our notation, r − δA = µA < 0 in the previous equation). Under
this particular assumption the equity value (13) is convex in the current cash flows x and
3Ericsson (2000) is perhaps the only paper that address the issue of the magnitude of the asset substitution
problem in a setting where bankruptcy is triggered by a covenant rule
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increasing with the volatility. Consequently, equityholders operate immediately at the largest
possible volatility. On the contrary, in our analysis we consider, as it is usually the case,
positive instantaneous expected growth rates (0 < µB < µA). A direct calculus shows that
the equity value (13) is concave in the current cash flows x, increasing in the rate of return
µ and decreasing in the volatility σ4. Thus, equityholders are never tempted by the poor
activity and the firm is liquidated at the exogenous trigger xCFL = c. Unfortunately, the
fact that equityholders never switch to the poor activity does not imply that agency costs of
debt are reduced. Quite on the contrary, numerical results show that rather than triggering
premature bankruptcy at the threshold xCFL , it is socially optimal to let equityholders switch
to the poor activity and liquidate at the threshold xBL lower than x
CF
L . This suggests that
less strong covenants that restrict the firm from adopting the poor activity may be useful
to reduce agency costs. Based on these remarks we now introduce the “no-switching based”
covenant rule defined as the lowest liquidation trigger such that the unique optimal policy
for equityholders is never to switch to the poor activity. We show thereafter that, depending
on the severity of the agency problem such a covenant can reduce or increase the agency
costs of debt.
Proposition 5.2 The smallest liquidation trigger such that the switching problem disap-
pears is given by
xNSL =
c
r
αB − αA
νA(1− αA)− νB(1− αB) .
First, note that xNSL < x
CF
L . In words, “cash flows based” covenant rule is not necessary
to give equityholders the right incentives never to switch to the poor activity. Triggering
bankruptcy at the lower trigger xNSL is sufficient. Second, remark that x
NS
L ≥ xAL ⇔ xAL ≥ xBL .
In words, the liquidation trigger xNSL is larger than x
A
L , (the optimal liquidation trigger when
there is no switching) if and only if equityholders have indeed incentives to switch. This last
remark shows that deterring risk shifting incentives is costly for the firm and highlights the
tradeoff between ex-post inefficient equityholders behavior and inefficient covenant restric-
tions. Third, note that the trigger xNSL is decreasing with the opportunity costs of switching
(∆µ). That is, when the difference in net present value of the two available activities in-
creases, equityholders have less incentives to switch to the poor activity, and consequently,
there is less need to engage in costly covenant restrictions to make them never choose the
poor activity.
4This point is remarked by Leland (1994) who notes that, when debt is protected by a positive net worth
covenant, equityholders will not gain by increasing firm risk and concludes that, in presence of potential
agency conflict, protected debt may be the preferred form of financing despite having lower potential tax
benefits. Leland(1994) does not however study the magnitude of agency costs at the optimal leverages nor
remarks that positive net worth covenant can trigger inefficient premature bankruptcy.
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Under the “no-switching based” covenant rule, the ex post value of the firm is given by
the following expression: v(x) = (1− θ)xνA +
θc
r
−
(
θc
r
+ (1− θ)xNSL γνA
)(
x
xNSL
)αA
if x > xNSL ,
v(x) = (1− γ)(1− θ)xνA if x ≤ xNSL .
Tables 6-9 compare the optimal capital structure and the magnitude of the agency costs
when bankruptcy is endogenous and when bankruptcy is triggered by our “no-switching
based” covenant rule. It turns out that the covenant restriction restores some value to
the firm only if the agency problem is severe enough. In Table 7 the covenant restriction
allows to reduce agency costs by more than 9% (accordingly, optimal leverage increases
from 43.84 % to 71.30%). In Table 9 the covenant rule allows to fully eliminate inefficient
shifting. However, when the opportunity shifting cost is low (∆µ small) and when the agency
problem not important (∆µ large with respect to ∆σ) , the covenant restriction may worsen
the situation. In table 6 agency costs increase from 1.02% for the endogenous bankruptcy
rule to 2.59% for the “no-switching based” covenant rule.
The fact that the “no-switching based” covenant rule worsens the situation when the
agency problem is not enough severe suggests to study a less strong covenant restriction
that may leave equityholders switch to the poor activity, but still entails liquidation of the
firm before equityholders will do (that is before the threshold xBL being reached). Precisely,
consider a covenant that imposes liquidation at a threshold xL ∈ [xBL , xNSL ], then equity-
holders react choosing a corresponding shifting trigger xS(xL). The switching trigger xS(xL)
can be explicitly computed and shown to be decreasing in xL on the interval [x
B
L , x
NS
L ] with
xS(x
B
L ) = xS and xS(x
NS
L ) = x
NS
L . This last equality corroborates proposition 5.2 and
states that equityholders never switch when liquidation is triggered at xNSL . We have then
numerically compared agency costs when the liquidation policy is defined by the threshold
xL = x
NS
L and when liquidation is triggered by xL ∈ [xBL , xNSL ). Our numerical results sug-
gest that the optimal liquidation policy consists of a binary choice xL = x
B
L or xL = x
NS
L .
That is, covenant restrictions may be useful only to the extent that they can fully deter the
switching problem. However, if the agency problem is not severe enough, covenants worsen
the situation and it is optimal to let equityholders acting strategically.
6. Conclusion.
Most of the literature on asset substitution in a contingent-claims analysis setting considers
the case in which the growth rate of the cash flows remains constant while the volatility of
the cash flows increases by moral hazard. In this paper we adopt the view that the level of
agency costs can be also due to bad investments rather than by simply pure excessive risk
taking. This leads us to consider a model in which both the drift and the volatility of the
cash flows are altered by equityholders decisions. We characterize explicitly equityholders
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optimal strategies and show using a numerical implementation of the model, that the risk of
switching to a poor business activity drastically decreases firm value and optimal leverages.
We furthermore investigate the role of positive net worth covenant written on the debt
in reducing or exacerbating the magnitude of agency costs. We show that covenants that
impede equityholders from switching to the poor business activity are not always value
enhancing because they imply premature bankruptcy. We find that when the agency problem
is not severe enough it is better letting equityholders switch to the poor business activity
and declare bankruptcy strategically. However when the agency problem is severe the “no-
switching” covenant rule that we propose dramatically reduces the of agency costs of asset
substitution.
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7. Appendix
Proof of lemma 3.2 Let denote ν = 1
r−µ , ασ the negative root of the quadratic equation
1
2
σy2 + (µ− 1
2
σ2)y − r = 0 and xσL = − ασ1−ασ cr 1ν . A direct computation shows that the map-
ping σ −→ xν − c
r
+
(
c
r
− xσLν
) (
x
xσL
)ασ
is increasing on (0,∞). Lemma 3.2 is then deduced
remarking that, if µA = µB, then x
A
L > x
B
L and thus EB(x) > EA(x) = 0 ∀xBL < x < xAL .
Proof of lemma 3.3 A sufficient condition for obtaining our result is E ′A(x) > E
′
B(x) for
all x > xBL . We have for all x > x
B
L :
1
1− θ (xE
′
A(x)− xE ′B(x)) = x(νA − νB) + αA(
c
r
− xALνA)
(
x
xAL
)αA
−αB(c
r
− xBLνB)
(
x
xBL
)αB
> xBL (νA − νB) + αA(
c
r
− xALνA)
(
x
xBL
)αA
−αB(c
r
− xBLνB)
(
x
xBL
)αB
> {xBL (νA − νB) + αA(
c
r
− xALνA)
−αB(c
r
− xBLνB)}
(
x
xBL
)αA
> {(νAxAL −
c
r
)(1− αA)
−(νBxBL −
c
r
)(1− αB)}
(
x
xBL
)αA
= 0
Proof of proposition 3.1
It follows from the strong Markov property that optimization problem (11) can be rewrit-
ten under the form
E(x) ≡ sup
τS∈T
E
[∫ τS
0
e−rt(1− θ) (Xxt,A − c) dt + e−rτSEB(XxτS ,A)] .
The proof5 of our proposition relies then on the following lemma which shows that the
optimal switching strategy is a trigger strategy.
Lemma 7.4 If
E(x) = E
[∫ τBL
0
e−rt(1− θ) (Xxt,B − c) dt
]
5Our problem is actually a particular case of a more general (and standard) problem in optimal stopping
theory which is stated and solved in Theorem 10.4.1, Oksendal (2003). We propose here an elementary proof
of our (simple) problem.
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then
E(x− h) = sup
τS∈T
E
[∫ τS
0
e−rt(1− θ) (Xx−ht,A − c) dt+ e−rτSEB(Xx−hτS ,A)]
= E
[∫ τBL
0
e−rt(1− θ) (Xx−ht,B − c) dt
]
Proof of the lemma 7.4: Taking advantage from the equalities Xx−ht,A = X
x
t,A −Xht,A and
X
Xx−hτ,A
t,B = X
Xxτ,A
t,B −X
Xhτ,A
t,B , we deduce from the definitions of E(x) and E(x− h)
E(x− h) ≤ E(x) − inf
τ∈T
{
(1− θ)E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtXht,Adt + e
−rτE
[∫ τBL
0
e−rtX
Xhτ,A
t,B dt | Fτ
]]}
Moreover,
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtXht,Adt
]
= νA
(
h− E [e−rτXhτ,A]) ,
E
[∫ τBL
0
e−rtX
Xhτ,A
t,B dt | Fτ
]
= νB
(
Xhτ,A − xBLE
[
e−rτ
B
L | Fτ
])
,
from which we deduce
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtXht,Adt + e
−rτE
[∫ τBL
0
e−rtX
Xhτ,A
t,B dt | Fτ
]]
= νAh− (νA − νB)E
[
e−rτXhτ,A
]− νBxBLE [e−rτe−rτBL ]
Now, from a standard result in optimal stopping theory we have that, supτ∈T E
[
e−rτXhτ,A
]
=
h which implies that
inf
τ∈T
{
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtXht,Adt + e
−rτE
[∫ τBL
0
e−rtX
Xhτ,A
t,B dt | Fτ
]]}
= E
[∫ τBL
0
e−rtXht,Bdt
]
.
We thus obtain
E(x− h) ≤ E
[∫ τBL
0
e−rt(1− θ) (Xx−ht,B − c) dt
]
.
As the converse inequality is always satisfied, lemma(7.4) is proved.
Thus, the optimal switching policy is a trigger policy. For a given switching trigger xS,
the equity value is given by standard computations
E(x) = (1− θ)
{
xνA − c
r
− xS(νA − νB)
(
x
xS
)αA
+
(
c
r
− xBLνB
) (
x
xS
)αA (
xS
xBL
)αB }
if x > xS,
E(x) = (1− θ)
{
xνB − c
r
+
(c
r
− xBLνB
)( x
xBL
)αB}
if xBL < x ≤ xS,
E(x) = 0 if x < xBL
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It is easy to see that this value function reaches its maximum for a value of xS that does not
depend on x, namely
xS =
(
(αB − αA)νB
(νA − νB)(1− αA)(−αB)
) 1
1−αB
xBL > x
B
L .
Proof of proposition 5.2
Since by construction EA(x
NS
L ) = EB(x
NS
L ) = 0, a necessary condition for equityholders
being not tempted by switching is E ′A(xL) > E
′
B(xL) where xL is a liquidation trigger. The
minimum liquidation trigger that satisfies this condition is implicitly defined by the equation
xLE
′
A(xL) = xLE
′
B(xL). This leads to xL = x
NS
L =
c
r
αB − αA
νA(1− αA)− νB(1− αB) . Conversely,
reasoning as in the proof of lemma 3.3, we show that EA(x)− EB(x) ≥ 0 for x ≥ xNSL .
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Tables.
Table 1. Parameters for the base case: γ is the bankruptcy cost, θ the tax rate, r the fixed
market interest rate and x the normalized initial cash flows value. Values we consider in our
analysis are standard in the continuous time corporate finance literature.
Table 1.
γ θ r x
0.4 0.35 0.06 5
Tables 2-5. Optimal capital structure and magnitude of the agency costs for the ex ante
case and for the ex post case, for different values of the couples (µA, σA) and (µB, σB). In
these tables, v(x) is the optimal firm value; c0(x) is the optimal coupon; L (in percentage
of the firm value) is the optimal leverage (D/v) where the debt value D is equal to v − E;
Y S (in basis points) is the yield spread (c/D − r) over the debt; AC (in percentage of the
ex ante firm value) is the magnitude of the agency costs.
Table 2.
σA = 0.15 ∆σ = 5% µA = 0.015 ∆µ = 0.5%
v(x) co(x) L(%) YS(bp) AC(%)
Ex ante 92.05 4.77 74.61 95 –
Ex post 91.11 4.54 72.07 91 1.02
Table 3.
σA = 0.1 ∆σ = 30% µA = 0.015 ∆µ = 0.5%
v(x) co(x) L(%) YS(bp) AC(%)
Ex ante 96.34 5.03 80.51 49 –
Ex post 83.58 2.37 43.84 47 13.24
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Table 4.
σA = 0.1 ∆σ = 30% µA = 0.03 ∆µ = 3%
v(x) co(x) L(%) YS(bp) AC(%)
Ex ante 148.37 7.88 83.91 33 –
Ex post 145.52 7.32 79.62 32 1.92
Table 5.
σA = 0.2 ∆σ = 20% µA = 0.03 ∆µ = 3%
v(x) co(x) L(%) YS(bp) AC(%)
Ex ante 135.88 7.08 72.54 118 –
Ex post 132.98 6.34 67.1 111 2.13
Tables 6-9. Optimal capital structure and magnitude of the agency costs when bankruptcy
is endogenous and when bankruptcy is triggered by our “no-switching based” covenant rule.
In these tables, v(x) is the optimal firm value; c0(x) is the optimal coupon; L (in percentage
of the firm value) is the optimal leverage (D/v) where the debt value D is equal to v − E;
Y S (in basis points) is the yield spread (c/D − r) over the debt; AC (in percentage of the
ex ante firm value) is the magnitude of the agency costs.
Table 6.
σA = 0.15 ∆σ = 5% µA = 0.015 ∆µ = 0.5%
v(x) co(x) L(%) YS(bp) AC(%)
Ex post case
with endogenous 91.11 4.54 72.07 91 1.02
bankruptcy
Ex post case
with no switching 89.64 4.19 73.22 38 2.59
based covenant
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Table 7.
σA = 0.1 ∆σ = 30% µA = 0.015 ∆µ = 0.5%
v(x) co(x) L(%) YS(bp) AC(%)
Ex post case
with endogenous 83.58 2.37 43.84 47 13.24
bankruptcy
Ex post case
with no switching 92.50 4.23 71.30 41 3.99
based covenant
Table 8.
σA = 0.1 ∆σ = 30% µA = 0.03 ∆µ = 3%
v(x) co(x) L(%) YS(bp) AC(%)
Ex post case
with endogenous 145.52 7.32 79.62 32 1.92
bankruptcy
Ex post case
with no switching 147.33 7.61 82.41 27 0.70
based covenant
Table 9.
σA = 0.2 ∆σ = 20% µA = 0.03 ∆µ = 3%
v(x) co(x) L(%) YS(bp) AC(%)
Ex post case
with endogenous 132.98 6.34 67.1 111 2.13
bankruptcy
Ex post case
with no switching 135.88 7.08 72.54 118 0
based covenant
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